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Dedicated Property
The trust which has been held by all the courts to be im-
pressed upon government-owned property used in governmental
activity by the states and the nation, and the trust which the
federal courts have declared to be impressed upon idle land owned
by the federal government, have been held to protect the property
thus impressed from the encroachment of eminent domain power.,
The basis for this protection has been found to be in solemn con-
stitutional obligations. If this trust character be considered as
arising out of contract, such a contract could be nothing less than
the great "social compact" which Rousseau says underlies all
good government by the consent of the governed. Trusts have
been created, which are administered by governmental agencies,
which can with much more definiteness be considered to have
arisen out of contract relations created by direct offer and accept-
ance. Of such a nature is a trust which arises out of the accept-
'This phase of the subject was discussed by the author in Colvin, Property
Which Cannot Be Reached by the Power of Eminent Domain for a Public Use
or Purpose (929) 78 U. OF PA. LAW REV. i. That article also considered prop-
erty which had the capacity to repel the invasion of the power of eminent domain,
by reason of (i) its physical characteristics, (2) the character of certain legal
interests involved, and (3) the depth of those interests.
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ance by governmental agents, in behalf of the people, of a prof-
fered dedication of land, or other property, with all its terms of
reservations, conditions, and restrictions. 2
As ordinary contracts are property,3 they may be taken by
the power of eminent domain, and paid for like other kinds of
property, with no greater injury done than is necessary for the
larger public good. If the exercise of eminent domain results
in the failure of performance of a contract, even on the part
of the condemnor, the condemnee is in no worse position than
when an ordinary individual chooses to exercise his legal power
(howsoever immorally) to breach the contract and pay damages.
These are the usual situations, and courts of justice have reacted
accordingly in their decisions. 4  In referring to the status of
contracts under the law of eminent domain, the late Mr. Justice
Brewer, of the Supreme Court of the United States, in a notable
opinion, said:
"A contract is property, and, like any other property,
may be taken under condemnation proceedings for public
use." 5
In regard to the application of the "contract clause" of the Federal
Constitution to eminent domain proceedings, he said, in his de-
cision in the same case:
"The true view is that the condemnation proceedings do
not impair the contract, do not break its obligations, but ap-
propriate it, as they do the tangible property ... .1 6
In the case of Cinciniati v. L. & N. R. R., Mr. Justice Lurton of
the same court, in reference to the same subject, said:
2 x8 C. J., tit. Dedication, §§ 7, 126 (1919).
'See cases cited infra note 4.
' Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685, 17 Sup. Ct 718
(1896) ; Cincinnati v. L. & N. R. R., 223 U. S. 390, 32 Sup. Ct. 267 (1910) ;
Cornwall v. L. & N. R. R., 87 Ky. 72, 7 S. W. 553 (1888) ; Matter of Opening
First St., etc., 66 Mich. 4-, 33 N. W. 15 (1887) ; Page v. Baltimore, 34 Md. 558
(1871) ; Matter of N. Y., etc., Ry., 44 Hun i94 (N. Y. 1887) ; Southern Cotton
Press and Mfg. Co. v. Galveston Wharf Co., 3 Tex. Civ. App. 309 (1887).
5 Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, supra note 4, at 691, 17 Sup.
Ct. at 720.
* Ibid.
TSupra note 4, at 400, 32 Sup. Ct. at 268.
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"If compensation be made, no constitutional right is vio-
lated."
It has so frequently been held that neither contracts them-
selves nor the "contract clause" of the Constitution can bar emi-
nent domain power from reaching the property which it desires
or needs for its legitimate ends,8 that textbooks 9 and encyclo-
pedias "0 have overlooked cases which have excepted from this
general rule peculiar situations presented in certain dedication
cases,1 ' where the invasion of eminent domain power would un-
conscionably frustrate the fulfillment of the double trust imposed
by the terms of the dedication, in behalf of the dedicator and his
beneficiaries.12  It has been held that the granting of the power
of eminent domain by the legislature, in general terms, cannot be
construed to empower the holder of the power to appropriate trust
property arising out of dedication,' 3 and that express legislative
'Cincinnati v. L, & N. R. R., supra note 4; Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hart-
ford, etc., R. R., 17 Conn. 40 (1845) ; Hyde Park v. Oakwoods Cemetery Ass'n,
119 Ill. 141, 7 N. E. 627 (x886) ; Terre Haute v. Evansville, etc., R. R., T9 Ind.
174, 46 N. E. 77, 37 L. R. A. i89 (1897); Cox v. Revelle, 125 Md. 579, 94 At.
203 (i915), L. R. A. [I915E] 443; Central Bridge Corp. v. Lowell, 70 Mass. 474
(1885) ; Back-us v. Lebanon, II N. H. i9 (i84o) ; Wood v. Millville, 89 N. J. L.
646, 98 At. 267 (ipi6) ; in re Kerr, 42 Barb. u9 (N. Y. 1864) ; Pennsylvania
Hospital v. Philadelphia, 254 Pa. 392, 98 At. IO77 (i916) ; West River Bridge
Co. v. Dix, i6 Vt. 446 (1844); Norfolk, etc., Ry. v. Virginian Ry., ITo Va. 631,
66 S. E. 863 (igio) ; State v. King County Super. Ct., 77 Wash. 593, 138 Pac.
277 (1914).
92 LEWIS, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. i9op) § 413; BuRnicx, T33E LAW OF
THE AmF.CAN CONSTITUTmON (1922) 419, 550.
20 12 C. J. 993 (917) ; 1o AM. AND ENG. ENcY. OF LAW (2d ed. 1899) io8p.
I' In reference to dedication cases, Thompson, J., of the United States Su-
preme Court, once said: "The law applies to them rules adapted to the nature and
circumstances of the case, and to carry into execution intention and object of
the grantor; and secure to the public the benefit held out, and expected to be
derived from, and enjoyedby the dedication." Cincinnati v. Lessee of White, 31
U. S. 431 (1832).
' This class of cases should be distinguished from cases where dedication
has been without restriction. Cases in this classification should also be dis-
tinguished from those cases wherein eminent domain power has been allowed to
reach the dedicated property, where the result has not been to deprive the public
of a substantial continuation of the same or similar benefits, nor to deprive the
dedicator of anything consistent with the trust and his real interest in it. Such
a situation is presented in the case of Cincinnati v. L. & N. R. R., supra note 4;
cf. Cornwall v. L. & N. R. R., supra note 4.
' South Western State Normal School's Case, 213 Pa. 244, 62 At. 908
(i9o6) ; President and Fellows of Middlebury College v. Central Power Corp.
of Vermont, 1I3 Atl. 384 (Vt. 1928) : In the Matter of the Petition of the Bos-
ton & Albany R. R., 53 N. Y. 574 (1873).
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authority to acquire "any real estate required for the purpose of
the incorporation" or to proceed against land when "the title is
invested in a trustee, not authorized to sell", is not strong enough
to warrant the use of eminent domain to appropriate property
dedicated to the public use, when it would result in a violation of
the obligation of the trust. 1  Although some of these decisions ,5
have indulged in obiter dicta 16 to the effect that it would take
a special act of the legislature, definitely naming the specific prop-
erty desired, to legalize an appropriation, yet, in cases of the
same character, where legislatures have gone to great pains to
empower the specific appropriation attempted, courts have dis-
allowed the appropriation, held the law unconstitutional, and
declared the legislature without the power thus to authorize the
invasion of a dedication trust and a violation of its material otf
essential obligations.
In a case before the District Court of Appeals of California,"7
on rehearing by direction of the supreme court of that state, the
court emphasized the binding effect of the acceptance of an offer of
dedication, as to observing its terms thereafter, and held that the
trustees themselves could not violate the trust obligations, nor
could the legislature empower anyone to do so. In that case the
city of San Diego, under authority from the state legislature,
attempted to lay out a highway across land dedicated to park pur-
poses, known as Washington Square. The highway would take
a strip of land from each side of the square and a strip, ninety
feet in width, off one end of it; comprising, in all, sixty per cent
of the square itself. The case came up on the question of the valid-
ity of certain lot assessments to help sustain the expense of laying
the highway. As to the dedication agreement, the court said:
" In the Matter of the Petition of the Boston & Albany R. R., supra note 13.
'United States v. Illinois Cent. R. R., Fed. Cas., No. 15,4,37, at 463 (C. C.
N. D. Ill. 1869); Codman v Crocker, 203 Mass. 146, I5O, 89 N. E. 177, 178
(19o9); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Cincinnati, 76 Ohio St. 481, 501, 81 N. E. 983,
988 (19o7) ; McCormac v. Evans, 107 S. C. 39, 42, 92 S. E. ig, 2o (1916).
1" For an example of this contrast between obiter dichum and decision by the
same court and the same judge, cf. Codman v. Crocker, supra note I5, with
Cary Library v. Bliss, infra note 31.
' Hall v. Fairchild-Gilmore-Wilton Co., 66 Cal. App. 615, 227 Pac. 649
(1924).
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" . . . it is well settled that if an owner of land has it
surveyed and platted with the intended public use clearly indi-
cated, allowing the public to so treat it, the offer to dedicate
is sufficient (citing cases). And that no formal accept-
ance is necessary to complete the dedication of the property
represented (citing cases) ; but use of the land by the public
for the purpose to which it was so dedicated is sufficient to
show an acceptance (citing cases).
"Under these and many other authorities which it is
unnecessary to accumulate, the uses to which Washington
Square has so long been devoted would seem to establish
its character as a pleasure ground, beyond question, as the
purpose for which it was dedicated . . ." 18
As to the legal effect of the trustees' attempt to relinquish that
portion of the dedicated property needed for the highway, the
court said:
"It may be said that the board of park commissioners
is entrusted by the city charter with the 'management and
control' of the park property, and that it appears from the
findings that this board requested the city council to adopt the
ordinance. However, this charter provision confers no au-
thority upon the board of park commissioners to destroy
the subject of its trust, or to devote it to uses other than
that of enjoyment and recreation. Its authority is merely
that of a trustee, invested with limited jurisdiction, having
imposed upon it the duty to protect parks within its manage-
ment and control, which should at the same time compel such
board to protest, rather than instigate, usurpation of author-
ity over parks of the city by another body, or pass its trust
property into the street department." "o
As to the legal effect of the act of the legislature and the ordi-
nance of the city, under the authority of which the taking was
attempted, the court said:
"We think it clear that the city council of San Diego
was utterly without jurisdiction to take over 6o per cent of
Washington Square, a public park, and make of it a high-
way, thus entirely withdrawing that portion of it from the
23 Ibid. 623, 227 Pac. at 652.
"Ibid. 624, 227 Pac. at 653.
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purposes of its original dedication. Numerous authorities
sustain the proposition that when land is once dedicated for
park purposes it is beyond the authority of a city, or even
the Legislature, to withdraw it therefrom." 20
In the case of City of Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Ry., 21 de-
cided by the Supreme Court of Illinois, the court had to pass upon
the validity of a special act of the legislature empowering the
railway company to construct and operate its "railway in, over,
across and along any and all the avenues, streets, public grounds,
squares and alleys" of Jacksonville, as applied to the appropria-
tion by the company of land of a recreation square dedicated to
the public by the original proprietors of the land. The city re-
sisted the appropriation and filed a bill for injunction. The in-
junction was denied in the trial court, and the case was appealed
to the Illinois Supreme Court. After stating that the company
claimed the right thus to "frustrate the original purpose for which
the ground was dedicated", Justice Thornton, for the court,
denied the existence of the power in the legislature to make such
an authorization. Said he:
"A dedication must always be construed with reference
to the object with which it was made. The donors never
could have intended that this ground should be used as a
street.
"The power of the legislature to repeal the charters of
municipal corporations can not be extended to the right to
divert property given to the public for one use, to a wholly
different and inconsistent use. The power can, not exist
to divert property from the purpose for which it was
donated. This plat was a solemn dedication of the ground
to the corporation, to be held in trust for the use of the pub-
lic. The donation was made for a certain specific and defined
purpose. That purpose is unmistakable. As soon as the plat
is recorded the statute declares the trust, that the property
shall be held for the uses intended, and for no other. The
city has accepted the trust. It must be preserved, or the
land must revert to the original proprietors. The city has
acted in good faith. It has inclosed, planted with trees and
20Ibid. 620, 227 Pac. at 651.
267 IM. 540 (1873).
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improved and embellished the ground dedicated, and thus
maintained the purpose of the donor. Lots abutting upon
the square have been purchased and built upon with reference
to it. They have also been made more valuable by this open
ground in front of them." 22
In holding the attempted appropriation invalid, the court said:
"In this case the attempted use of the public square by
the railway company for the track of its road, is a manifest
perversion of the trust created and declared; would operate
injuriously to the public and the abutting lot owners; would
mar the beauty of the ground, destroy it as a place of public
recreation, and cannot be justified.
"We are, therefore, of opinion that the railway com-
pany should be perpetually enjoined from all attempts to
lay down the track of its road through or across the inclosed
public square." 23
It has been contended that the general rule that the legis-
lature has no power to divert the use of dedicated property 
2 4
should not be applied in those cases where the diversion is sought
to be accomplished by the employment of eminent domain power,
because those whose interests are injured are recompensed in
money for what is taken. This argument was presented to the
Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of South Park Commis-
sioners v. Montgomery Ward.25 The South Park Commissioners
of Chicago had lost in suits involving the question of their
power, under authorization of the legislature, to erect buildings in
Grant Park, contrary to the terms of the dedication of the land
for park purposes. It was held in these suits that the legislature
could not authorize the breach of the accepted terms of the dedi-
cation. No attempt had been made to use the power of eminent
domain. The legislature passed an act authorizing the South
Park Commissioners to erect a museum and a public library in
the park, and provided for condemnation, by the power of eminent
domain, of "any private right, easement, interest or property
2Ibid. 543.
23 Ibid. 545.
"See cases cited infra note ioo; i8 C. J. 127 (1919).
248 Ill. 209, 93 N. E. gio (igio).
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right to have the park remain open or vacant". Acting under the
added authority of the eminent domain act of the legislature, the
Park Commissioners again started proceedings toward erecting
the museum, to be known as the Field Museum of 'Natural His-
tory, and the library, to be known as the John Crear Library.
This time they filed petitions to condemn and pay for the rights
and easements, held by private individuals, to have the park kept
free from such structures under the terms of the dedication. Con-
demnation proceedings were resisted by owners of lots opposite
the park, protected by the terms of the dedication, and the case
reached the Illinois Supreme Court. The majority opinion was
adverse to the petitioners.20  The minority opinion was that the
dedication contract could not stand in the way of the exercise of
the power of eminent domain'. After stating that eminent domain
might attempt to reach property for a recognized public use and
yet fail because, among other reasons, the public use might be a
"subversion of natural or constitutional right", -Cartwright, J.,
referred to the previous decisions and said:
"If the legislature had no power to change the uses
of Grant Park and to disregard the terms of the dedications
by authorizing the erection and maintenance of buildings in
the park, there could be no condemnation of the rights of
the defendants that the park should be kept free from build-
ings, whatever the nature of such rights might be. It is not
thought that the state can divest itself of the right of enii-
nent domain to take private property for public use, but the
settled law of this state is that if the owner of private prop-
erty offers to donate it to the public for a specified public
use, and the offer is accepted and the property devoted to
such use, the State cannot change the use and apply the prop-
erty to some'other use inconsistent with the dedication." 27
Referring' to the argument that condemnation and compensa-
tion gave a stronger-'power to interfere with the trust obligation
'In Le Clercq.v. Gallipolis, 7 Ohio 218 (835), the fact that ample pay-
ment was to be received was not allowed to neutralize the illegality of a 'special
legislative enactment empowering the leasing of the dedicated lands for uses
which would violate the trust imposed by the terms of the dedication. Decisions
have held the same as to sale and payment. See cases digested in 'Note (igio)
25 L. R. A. (N. s.) 98o.
I Supra note 25, at 306, 93 N. E. at 913.
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arising out of the terms of the dedication agreement, Justice
Cartwright said:
"It is urged against the application of the doctrine of
res judicata that the question of the right to erect buildings
in the park upon ascertaining the compensation to be paid
to Ward was not considered or decided in that case or the
subsequent cases. That is true, but the basic question
whether the legislature could authorize the constructi6n of
buildings in the park, which lies at the foundation of the
right to condemn, was determined. If the legislature had
no right to erect the buildings, which are now alleged to be
a public use, they could not provide for taking the right of
any person or appropriating his property for such use. To
say that having acquired the right to ascertain and pay the
damage to the property of Ward gives the right to change
the use and violate the restriction which did not before exist
would be reasoning backward. A superstructure does not
support the foundation, and a lawful public use lies at the
very foundation of the right to appropriate property or prop-
erty rights." 28
As previously stated, dedications for public use involve a
double trust-a trust in behalf of the dedicator, and a trust in
behalf of the portion of the public for whose use or benefit the
dedication is made. The state, or its subdivision, has not been
allowed by the courts to occupy the inconsistent position of pre-
serving the trust and at the same time violating it. This is
a fundamental reason why, in such cases, courts have held that
neither a state nor a municipal legislature has the police power,
under the Constitution, to violate the obligations of what amounts
to the dedication contract, even for a recognized public use or
purpose.29 The South Park Commissioners v. Montgomery
= Supra note 25, at 3o9, 93 N. E. at 914.
Trustees of Watertown v. Cowen, 4 Paige 5IO (N. Y. 1834) ; Common-
wealth v. Alburger, i Whart 469 (Pa. 1836); Pomeroy v. Mills, 3 Vt 379
(183o) ; Abbott v. Mills, 3 Vt. 521 (1831); Adams v. S. & W. R. R., ii Barb.
414 (N. Y. i851); Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (U. S. 18io); Godfrey v.
City of Alton, 12 Ill 29 (850) ; Haight v. City of Keokuk, 4 Iowa igg (1856) ;
Grant v. City of Davenport, i8 Iowa 179 (865); Le Clercq v. Trustees of
Gallipolis, .supra note 26; Common Council of Indianopolis v. Croas, 7 Ind. 9
(i855) ; Rowan's Ex'r v. Portland, 8 B. Mon. 232 (Ky. 1847) ; Augusta v.
Perkins, 3 B. Mon. 437 (Ky. 1843); SEDGwicx, CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTE
LAw (2d ed. 1874) 343.
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Ward case held that this fundamental reason, which prevents police
powers from frustrating the trust, is equally applicable and effec-
tive in preventing eminent domain power from violating the trust
and reaching the dedicated property, even for a recognized public
use or purpose. If the reasoning of Justice Cartwright be sound, it
would seem that a still further step could be taken in legal reason-
ing, leading to the conclusion that the decision of the Dartmouth
College Case "0 should apply as well to this class of eminent
domain power cases as it has been held to apply to police power
cases where attempts have been made to frustrate trust obligations
incurred by government, its subdivisions, or agencies. The transi-
tion was made by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in the Cary
Library Case.81
In the Cary Library Case,"2 the legislature of Massachusetts
created a close corporation and authorized it to acquire by emi-
nent domain all the books, pamphlets, funds, and property of the
Cary Library, situated in the town of Lexington, by the exercise
of the power of eminent domain. The trustees of the Cary Li-
brary refused to obey a vote of the people of the town to release
the property when it was moved against by the corporation under
the legislative authorization, on the ground that the property was
trust property, coming into their hands as designated trustees
as a result of a dedication which restricted the management to
them. The newly-formed corporation petitioned the Middlesex
County Court for a writ of mandamus to compel delivery, and
the court reported the case to the Massachusetts Supreme Court,
"for the opinion of the full court". The evidence revealed that
Maria Cary had written a letter to the selectmen of the town,
proposing a gift of money for the foundation of a library for
the benefit of the people of the town, upon condition that the
selectmen.and the school committee of the town, together with the
help of the local settled minister, should invest the funds received
from her and expend the accruing interest, in their best discretion,
-Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat 518 (U. S.
18ig).
'Cary Library v. Bliss, i5i Mass. 364, 25 N. E. 92, 7 L. R. A. 765 (18go).
*Ibid. That portion of the decision which referred to the impotency of
eminent domain to reach money and promissory notes, and to the lack of neces-
sity of change of administration, is treated elsewhere in this article.
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for such books as they should deem suitable, and should supervise
the library and pass such rules and regulations for its management
as they should consider conducive to the public interest. At a town
meeting the people of the town voted to accept her. proposition
and comply with all the conditions annexed to the gift. The funds
were accordingly furnished and the library established, and, under
the same arrangement, she added from time to time to the original
amount. The court was of the opinion that Maria Cary placed
special confidence in those occupying the official positions of
selectmen and school committee and the settled minister; and that
their administration of the library was a very important condition
of the trust, which would be frustrated by allowing eminent do-
main power to throw the property and management into the hands
of the newly-established corporation, whose board of directors
had the power to withdraw from the original trustees all their
original power and activities. The opinion of the court was de-
livered by Knowlton, J. In regard to the application to the case
of the provision of the Federal Constitution prohibiting the im-
pairment of the obligation of contracts by state laws, he said:
"The acceptance by the town of Maria Cary's proposi-
tion contained in her letter created a contract, which was
executed on her part by the payment of the money, and
which continued binding on the town and the trustees as to
their conduct in reference to the charity. Prior to the
decision in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518,
it was uncertain what construction would be given by the
Supreme Court of the United States to the word 'contracts'
in Section io of Article i of the Constitution of the United
States, which provides that no State shall pass any 'law
impairing the obligation of contracts.' It was settled by that
case that the word is to be interpreted broadly and liberally,
so as to include all obligations which should be enforced
and held sacred growing out of agreements, express or im-
plied, for which there is a valuable consideration. There can
be no doubt that the money of Maria Cary was paid under a
contract, within the meaning of that word in this clause of
the Constitution. The principles by which the courts of
England and of this country have been controlled, in the
decisions to which we have referred, are those rules of com-
mon right which protect men in their transactions with one
another. Among them is that fundamental one which is em-
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bodied in this provision of the Constitution. If it applies
to a change in the administration of a charitable trust such
as has been attempted in the present case, it controls the
action of the Legislature as effectually as that of the
courts." 33
In holding that the contract clause of the Constitution was
applicable to the situation and prevented the acquisition by the
corporation of the property in question by the power of eminent
domain, Justice Knowlton said:
"We are of opinion that the statute which we are con-
sidering impairs the obligation of the contract under which
this charity is administered. The principles which lie at the
foundation of the Dartmouth College case, and of other sim-
ilar decisions, are decisive of the question before us. Louis-
ville v. University of Louisville, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 642.
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518. Allen v.
McKeen, i Sumner, 276. New Gloucester School Fund v.
Bradbury, 2 Fairf. i 18. Regents of University of Maryland
v. Williams, 9 Gill & J. 365, 408. Norrisv. Abington Acad-
emy, 7 Gill & J. 7. Brown v. Hummel, 6- Penn -St. 86, 96.
The law laid down in these cases, that a charter estab-
lishing an eleemosynary corporation is a contract which can-
not be changed by the Legislature without the consent of the
parties to it, is a mere extension of the doctrine which gives
a similar effect to the written statement of a scheme that is
made the foundation of donations to unincorporated trustees
of a public charity." 34
Ibid. 375, 25 N. E. at 94.
Ibid. 378, 25 N. E. at 95. Mr. Justice Knowlton expressed some anxiety,
in his decision of the Cary case, as to the reversion of the park property to the
dedicators, if its use were allowed to be diverted from the terms of dedication.
In the case of Porter v. International Bridge Co., 2oo N. Y. 234, 93 N. E. 716
(igo), the Court of Appeals of New York found a way to avoid holding that
the taking of dedicated property by eminent domain for another purpose was
an invasion of the obligation of the trust under the situation presented, by hold-
ing that the voluntary acquiescence on the part of trustees, administrators, and
the public as cestui qe tnwrt to the taking of the dedicated property by a cor-
poration with power of eminent domain, was an abandonment of the dedicated
property and the trust, and that it could then be said to be taken by the power of
eminent domain, without violating any trust. Some of the cases which we have
discussed, where either the trustees or the beneficiaries have gone into equity to
restrain eminent domain condemnation, could have been decided against the
condemnor on the ground that the prayer for injunction was an appeal to the
courts to prevent a forced abandonment of the dedicated property, resulting in
its falling back into the hands of the dedicator as the true and full owner.
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Whether one agrees in all particulars with the reasoning of
this decision, or with South Park Commissioners v. Montgomery
Ward and other decisions to which we have referred, it is evi-
dent that more decisions arriving at the same result would go
a long way toward reducing the present suspicion and lack of con-
fidence which prevents many well-disposed persons from donating
valuable property to states and municipalities, for the benefit of
the people.
Substituted Ownership and Identical Public Use
It has been decided repeatedly that the power of eminent
domain is such a constituent attribute of sovereignty that the
government cannot grant it away beyond its power of recapture,
35
and that devotion of property to a public use does not save it
There is no reason why this ground should not be a part of any petition to en-
join eminent domain condemnation against dedicated property. It appear.; to
be a valid basis for a prayer for relief through a restraining order.
When its sense of right is shocked, a court will sometimes go to great
lengths to find legal justification for a decision which is just to the party
wronged. An example of a decision in the opposite direction to that of Porter
v. International Bridge Co., is that of Jersey City v. National Docks Ry.,
55 N. J. L. I94, 26 At. 145 (1893), where a contract prohibiting the exercise
of eminent domain was indirectly sustained by the aid of a statute, which in
other states has been interpreted as having been passed for another purpose alto-
gether. Many of the states in the Union have statutes requiring an unsuccessful
attempt to purchase as a condition precedent to the institution of eminent domain
proceedings, This has been uniformly construed by the courts as a precaution-
ary measure, to prevent unnecessary expense and litigation. 2 LEwis, op. cit.
supra note 9, § 497, n. i. In these same states 'the condemnor has been allowed
to take, by eminent domain, property which he agreed not to take, in a previous
purchase or other agreement. Ibid. § 416. However, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey has given to this statute what must be considered a novel slant,
as compared with judicial interpretation of the same type of statute in other
jurisdictions. In the case of Jersey City v. National Docks Ry. the decision
of the court, and the pertinent facts, were summarized in the syllabus, as fol-
lows: "Where a railroad company acquires a right of way for the construction
of a bridge over city property by contract with the city, conditioned that the
right of way must be used so as not to interfere with the city's right to open a
street under such right of way, the company cannot thereafter repudiate its
agreement, and acquire a right of way by condemnation, as inability to agree
with the owner is a jurisdictional fact necessary to legalize condemnation pro-
ceedings; Revision, p. 928, § ioO, authorizing condemnation proceedings only
where the company cannot agree with the owner for the use or purchase of
lands."
'Richmond, etc., R. R. v. Louisiana R. R., 13 How. 71 (U. S. 1851) ; West
River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507 (U. S. 1848); Charles River Bridge v.
Warren Bridge, ii Pet. 42o (U. S. 1837); New York, etc., R. R. v. Boston,
etc., R. R., 36 Conn. 196 (1869) ; Little Miami, etc., R. R. v. Dayton, 23 Ohio St.
510 (1872) ; Giesy v. Cincinnati, etc., R. R., 4 Ohio St. 308 (1854) ; Southwest
Pennsylvania Pipe Lines v. Directors of the Poor, i Pa. Co. Ct. 460 (1886).
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from being taken away from its owners by the force of its inva-
sion.3 6 This being the case, property acquired by the exercise
of eminent domain power and strictly'devoted to the authorized
purpose for which it was condemned can be taken away from the
first taker by another who has been adequately armed by the
legislature with eminent domain power to do so, 37 and, likewise,
it is possible to take property received through grant or franchise
from the government and used in fulfillment of its public purpose
obligations,38 and property voluntarily devoted to public use or
purpose. 39 All must submit to acquisition through the exercise
of the power of eminent domain, upon the principle of the
prerogative power of sovereignty. If this were not so, it has
been said by a learned judge, "great public improvements ren-
dered necessary by the increasing wants of society in the develop-
ment of civilization and the progress of the arts might be pre-
vented" .
40
However, the "due process" clause of the federal and state
constitutions enunciates another principle in behalf of the individ-
ual property owner, and, when it has come in conflict with the
principle of the prerogative of sovereign eminent domain, the
latter sometimes has had to give way. It has been held that
eminent domain power cannot be employed to take property by the
kind of undue process of law whose description has found expres-
sion in the classical example of "taking the property from A to
convey it to B".41 The fact that the taking has behind it the prestige
and power of eminent domain, and that the property is to be
paid for by ample compensation, has not been allowed to impair
the integrity and applicability of this ancient example. In an
early case before the Supreme Court of the United States, Mr.
Justice Story said:
' See the list of cases in 2o C. J. 599, I. 77 (,920).
'7 New York, etc., R. R. v. Boston, etc., R. R., saprac note 35.
' COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (6th ed. 189o) 337.
Starr Burying Ground Ass'n v. North Lane Cem. Ass'n, 77 Conn. 83, 58
Atl. 467 (19o4). This does not include certain dedicated property devoted to
public use under trust conditions previously referred to in this article.
0 Bigelow, J., in Central Bridge Corporation v. Lowell, supra note 8, at
482.
'West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, supra note 35, at 537.
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"Although the sovereign power in free government may
appropriate all the property, public as well as private, for
public use, making compensation therefor, yet it has never
been understood, at least never in our Republic, that the
sovereign power can take the private property of A and give
it to B by the right of eminent domain." 42
Mr. Justice Story's statement, made in 1837, very well ex-
presses what should be the correct rule today.43 The word "pri-
vate" refers to ownership and not to use, so that if A, as an indi-
vidual or corporation, is devoting his or its property to a public
use, it would still be "private property" under the relations which
we are discussing.44 Under the above rule it could not be taken
away from A merely in order to give it to B, and it has been
held that this could not be done even though B was attempting to
acquire it by eminent domain power for a recognized public use
or purpose, which was the same use or purpose to which A had
been devoting the property.4 5 This would amount to nothing
more than the compulsory change of hands in the property and
would result in eminent domain power's taking it from A merely
in order to give it to B.46  Property in public use cannot be taken
to be used for the same purpose and in the same manner. 47  This
being a constitutional prohibition, under the due process clause, it
is not only a prohibition on the one to whom the power of eminent
domain has been delegated by the legislature, but it is a restriction
upon the legislature itself, and any law authorizing generally or
specifically such a taking is unconstitutional and should so be held. 48
"Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, supra note 35, at 642.
2 Lewis, op. cit. supra, note 9, § 44o.
L4 ake Shore and Mich. So. Ry. v. Chicago & Western Ind. R. R., 97 Ill.
5o6 (i88r) ; West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, supra note 35.
"Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry. v. Chicago & Western Ind. R. R., supra
note 44.
"Suburban R. R. v. Metropolitan West Side El. R. R., 193 Ill. 217, 6I N.
E. io9o (i9oa).
,' See cases cited infra note 48.
"West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, mfpra note 35; Starr Burying Ground
Ass'n v. North Lane Cem. Ass'n, supra note 39; Marsh Min. Co. v. Inland Em-
pire Min., etc., Co., 30 Idaho 1, 165 Pac. 1128 (1916) ; Suburban R. R. v. Metro-
politan West Side El. R, R., supra note 46; St. Louis, etc., R. R. v. Belleville
City Ry., 158 Ill. 390, 41 N. E. 916 (1895) ; Chicago West Div. Ry. v. Metro-
politan West Side El. R. R., x5 I1. 59, 38 N. E. 736 (1894); Chicago & N.
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"Where there is no change in use there cannot be a changq in own-
ership under the law of eminent doman." "
This rule agaiqst substituted ownership and identical use
found expression eighty-three years ago in a decision of the Su-
preme Court of the United States, to the effect that the legislature
cannot take the property of A, such as a toll bridge, and transfer
it to B, to be used as a toll bridge by B in the same manner as it
had previously been-used; 5  and state courts have since followed
the same rule in similar situations. It was accordingly held in the
Cary Library Case," that, independently of the trust invasion,
which we have discussed, the special legislative act authorizing
a corporation to take over the library property from the old trus-
tees, by exercise of the power of eminent domain, was unconsti-
tutional, because the very legislative act itself provided that the
property in the hands of the new trustees "was to be held and
applied by the corporation in the same manner as if held by said
trustees".5 2  In the case of the Oregon Cascade R. R. v. Baily,"
the legislature did not provide that the railroad property to be
condemned should be used for the same purpose and in the same
manner as it was in the hands of the condemnee, but the court held
that, if as a matter of fact such was the case, that was sufficient
to overcome the force of eminent domain and protect the property
from being taken by its power, under the rule of decision in such
situations, that courts may look to what happens or is attempted
under a legislative act, as well as to the legislative act itself.
In the city of Chicago a street railway secured, partly by
purchase and partly by eminent domain, a right of way to connect
W. Ry. v. Chicago & E. R. R., 112 Ill. 589 (1884); Cary Library v. Bliss, sapra
note 31; Kansas & Texas Coal Ry. v. Northwestern Coal, etc., Co., 16l Mo.
288, 61 S. W. 684 (gol) ; Oregon Cascade R. R. v. Baily, 3 Ore. 164 (1869) ;
State v. Mason County Super. Ct., 99 Wash. 496, 169 Pac. 9 (igi) ; State v.
Spokane County Super. Ct., 84 Wash. 20, 145 Pac. 999 (1915) ; State v. Pacific
County Super. Ct, 65 Wash. 29, 117 Pac. 755 (1911); State v. Skamania
County Super. Ct., 47 Wash. 166, 91 Pac. 637 (i9o7) ; Samish River Boom Co.
v. Union Boom Co., 32 Wash. 586, 73 Pac. 670 (1903).
'Suburban R. R. v. Metropolitan West Side El. R. R., mtprr note 46, at
223, 6i N. E. at io92.
' West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, supra note 35.
Cary Library v. Bliss, supra note 31.
Ibid. 379, 25 N. E. at 95.
s Supra note 48.
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its track with the tracks of a second company. Under authority of
a city ordinance the second company brought proceedings to con-
demn the same right of way, which would also afford it better con-
nections with a third company. The condemnation was resisted
and the case reached the Supreme Court of Illinois, 4 where Cart-
wright, J., in the course of the opinion for the court, said:
"The purpose to which the petitioner proposes to devote
the property is in law precisely the same as the purpose for
which it is already held by the defendant. To vest title in
the petitioner would be nothing more or less than a mere
change of ownership for the same public use, so that the in-
cline and tracks would be owned by the petitioner, rather
than the defendant." '
He then stated the law, in the short phrase which has found a per-
manent place in legal literature:
"Where there is no change in the use there cannot be
a change in ownership under the law of eminent domain." 56
Most cases, of the character which we are discussing, are
cases where the land moved against by eminent domain is already
devoted to the same public use to which the condemnor wishes
to put it. It has been held, however, that land not yet put to such
use, but held as part of a plan which contemplates its being put
to such use, is equally immune from condemnation, upon a "show-
ing of a reasonable necessity for use in a reasonable time". 5"
In referring to such a situation, a decision of the Supreme Court
of Washington says:
"We have also held that property owned by a corpora-
tion, 'and not actually devoted to a public use' may be ac-
quired by condemnation . . . The right to condemn in a
particular case depends upon all the attendant facts and
circumstances .
Suburban P. R. v. Metropolitan West Side El. R. R., supra note 46.
Ibid. 222, 6 N. E. at IO9i.
5 Ibid. 223, 6I'N. E. at I092; 20 C. J. 6oo (i92o).
"State v. Spokane County Super. Ct., suprG note 48, at 27, x45 Pac. at
1001.
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"It has become the settled law of the state that a public
service corporation may acquire property by condemnation
or otherwise in reasonable anticipation of its future needs.
When property has been so acquired, it is deemed devoted
to a public use, although not actually devoted to such use,
until there has been an abandonment of the intention so to
use." 58
The syllabus of the case summarizes the holding of the court
as follows:
"A corporation constructing a hydroelectric power plant
for a public purpose cannot condemn a power site owned by
another public utilities corporation which intends to con-
struct thereon a similar power plant, since property owned by
a corporation and devoted to a public use cannot be con-
demned by another corporation for use in the same manner
and for the same purpose." 5'
As neither party in such cases has yet actually engaged in the
contemplated activity, and as the party whose property is being
moved against has already gone far enough to acquire it for the
contemplated use, this decision seems to represent the nearest
approach to justice possible in such situations. A harder case
would be presented if the condemnor was already engaged in the
public purpose activity in question and needed more land.
A subsequent case before the same court presented a stronger
case for the plaintiff, but the holding of the land for future use
was decided to be sufficient to block eminent domain from reaching
it.60 The statutes of Washington gave the Board of Land Com-
missioners the power to grant the right of flooding state lands
for electric power purposes, for public use, to any person or cor-
poration; and one Tilden and his wife secured such a grant with
respect to certain state lands. Unlike the defendants in the
previous case, they were not in the public utility business, with a
going concern. They did not put the right, or easement, to any use,
and a power company brought proceedings to condemn it for im-
'Ibid. 25, 145 Pac. at I0o.
r9 145 Pac. 9 (1915).
o State v. Mason County Super. Ct., suipra -ote 48.
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mediate use. The power company showed itself to be a corpora-
tion with power of eminent domain, stock fully subscribed, annual
license fee paid, possessing lands for the dam site, and works
already laid out and surveyed; and it was ready to go ahead
with the business of generating and furnishing power to the public,
upon acquiring the needed right to overflow state lands, which was
sought by the proceedings. It contended that defendants' unused
"naked right should be allowed to be condemned by the eminent
domain proceedings". After stating the rule against allowing
condemnation for the same use or purpose, the court held that,
upon a showing to the Board of Commissioners that the defend-
ants had failed to use the right granted them, it might be revoked,
but, until revoked, it was immune from being taken by the power
of eminent domain, although not put to use.
In Idaho, under its constitution, the necessary use of lands
for mining is a public use, and land may be acquired for such use
by eminent domain. One mining company, which was a going
concern, successfully engaged in mining commercial ore, was
allowed by the local district court to take land, which it needed for
the continuation of its industry, from another mining company.
It needed the land for tramways, storage, dumps, etc. On appeal,
the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the judgment allowing the con-
demnation, because in its opinion the evidence showed the taking
was in order that the land might be "used in the same mannet
and for the same purpose" for which it was "in good faith being
held".6 1 The court so held, although the land was not in use and
its future use was not certain, but rested upon the contingency
of the defendant's discovering ore in paying quantities, which it
had not done on the property of which this was a part. The court
said:
"It appears that appellant and its predecessors have ex-
pended about $2o,ooo in the development of the Never Sweat
claim; that while ore in paying quantities has never been dis-
covered some ore has been found, and that appellant is still
prospecting, in good faith, and expending its money in an
effort to develop a mine, and also that if commercial ore in
"1Marsh Min. Co. v. Inland Empire Mint. Co., supra note 48, at 8, 65 Pac.
at ii29.
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paying quantities is discovered in the Never Sweat claim, a11
the level ground sought to be condemned will be necessary
to its owner in its development and operation for the same use
to which respondent seeks to appropriate it." 62
Chief Justice Sullivan dissented from the majority opinion, on
the ground that the land in question only had a "possibility" of
future public use and should therefore submit to acquisition by
eminent domain. The case probably illustrates the extreme limit
to which any court would be likely to go in protecting property
from a change of hands where there is no change of use. The
dissenting opinion may find greater favor in the minds of some
judges and lawyers.6 3  However, when the gambling nature of
the whole mining enterprise is taken into consideration, especially
that part which involves the discovery of ore in a paying quantity,
a liberal view of what constitutes "held for use" can be approved
on the ground of justice to the adventurer who takes such large
risks of failure.
In the case against Tilden and his wife, 64 which we have
discussed, counsel for the defendants successfully presented an
argument for the preservation of the grant, which would be
equally applicable in any case where the condemnor was operating
under a general power of eminent domain, rather than under
a special power covering the specific property moved against. That
argument was that, where property is acquired through a grant
or power from the state, for a specifically authorized use or pur-
pose, it could not have been intended that the state's power should
be used by an individual or corporation to take that same property
away again and bestow it on another for the identical use or pur-
pose, for this would be an inconsistent exercise of sovereign
power. The trial court adopted this theory as applied to the
grant, and was confirmed in so doing by the Washington Supreme
Court, in the following language:
IIbid. 7, i65 Pac. at ii29. (Italics are the author's.)
'See Colorado E. Ry. v. Union Pac. Ry., 41 Fed. 293, 300 (C. C. Colo.
i89o), where the court said with regard to a defense of "future use', "this is
but a prospective dedication which may or may not ever be made", and allowed
the condemnation.
"State v. Mason County Super. Ct., mpra note 48.
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"We cannot believe that the state in the exercise of its
sovereignty in dealing with this matter would contemplate
the grant of the right through one agency and the taking
away of the same right through another agency giving it to
someone else." 6
It appeared in that case that the petitioner and defendant
were rivals, and that both had applied to the Board of Land Com-
missioners for the grant of the same right, and that the grant
had been denied the petitioner and given to the defendant. In the
field of business, cases before the courts often present the situation
of one business rival attempting to condemn by eminent domain
the property of the other, in order to devote it to the same pur-
pose, with the object in view of destroying or crippling the com-
petitor or taking a certain amount of business away from him.
It has never been the policy of our government to allow its
agencies to be used by one business competitor to injure an-
other.66 When this is shown to be the motive, the question of
public policy, as well as of service to the public, enters and gives
an added support to the rule of disallowing a change of owner-
ship when there is no change of use. Justice Valliant of the
Supreme Court of Missouri, in dissenting from a majority opinion
which allowed a taking by eminent domain power, expressed the
desirability of courts looking into the motive of rival concerns
in such cases, as follows:
"The evidence in the record showed to the satisfaction
of the trial court, and it shows to my satisfaction, that this
is a controversy between two rival coal companies, wherein
one, having assumed for the purpose the legal garb of a rail-
road corporation, is endeavoring to shut its rival from the
market and reduce it to a dependency." 67
After reviewing the evidence supporting this conclusion, he said
further:
'Ibid. 5oo, x69 Pac. at 995.
"No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to
obtain advantages or particular and exclusive privileges distinct from those of
the community, than what arises from consideration of services rendered to the
public." MAss, BnL OF RIGHTS, art. 6, as quoted by Story, J., in Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge, supkrt frite 35, at 6o6.
w kansas & Texas Coal Ry. V, North Western Coal, etc., Co., supra note 48,
at 327, 61 S. W. at 693.
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"But the answer to all this is that the charter is con-
clusive, and the courts are not only powerless to grant any
relief, but must even suffer themselves to be used to effect the
gross wrong and abuse. If that is the law we are in a bad
way. If courts are so encrusted in form that they are not
only powerless to do right, but must even yield themselves
as instruments to effect a wrong, we are far from perfection.
I do not believe that that is the law." os
In the first Washington power case, previously discussed, 9
one power company was trying by eminent domain to oust another
power company from a desired location. In the street railway
case, 70 the purpose of the attempted condemnation was to connect
the condemnor with a rival of the condemnee. The syllabus of the
latter case, on this point, summarized the decision of the court
as follows:
"Where a street railway company has procured a right
of way to connect its track with the track of another com-
pany, the latter cannot condemn and take such right of way
to connect its track with a rival company." 71
In the Marsh Mining Company Case, to which'we have re-
ferred,72 the defendant mining company contended that if the
plaintiff mining company were allowed to take the land moved
against "then the development of the remaining portion of its
property might as well cease". The part of the decision of, the
court, in response to the evidence supporting the defendant's con-
tention in this respect, reads as follows:
"It was not the intention of the framers of the Con-
stitution nor of the Legislature, that the power of eminent
domain be so invoked that one mine will be developed and
thereby another mine be, destroyed, or that one mine owner
would be enriched and another impoverished. The aid of
eminent domain is extended to the industry, not to the indi-
vidual." 13
Ibd. 528, 61 S. W. at 694.
"'State v. Spokane County Super. Ct., supra note 48.
Suburban R. R. v. Metropolitan West Side El. R. R., .tpra note 46.
"Ibid.
Supra note 48.
"Supra note 48, at io, 165 Pac. at 1130.
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In the state of Washington, boom companies are public ser-
vice companies and have authority to condemn property for their
use by eminent domain. In a condemnation proceeding by one
boom company against another, to gain the latter's tide lands, the
order of condemnation was denied and the case came before the
supreme court of the state for review on a writ of certiorari. In
affirming the decision below, the court, through Mount, J., said:
"In this case, it appears that the relator seeks the land
of the Nicomen Boom Company to be used by the relator
for the same purpose, and in the same locality, and in the
same manner, that it is already being used by the Nicomen
Boom Company, and necessarily in competition with that
company. It is plain that one public service corporation
may not condemn the property of another public service cor-
poration to be used for the same purpose, at the same place,
and in the same manner it is already being used, when its use
is necessary for the other corporation." 7
The property was not. held in the name of the boom company,
but in the name of the third party, and it was contended that this
fact made it subject to condemnation. As to this contention,.
Mount, J., said:
"The fact that the record title to the land stands in the
name of Mr. McGowan is of no importance when it is shown
that he is merely a trustee, and that actual possession is in
the Nicomen Boom Company, and that company is using the
property for a public service, and the property is necessary
to serve the purpose of its business which is the same as that
of parties seeking to condemn." 75
Since rivalry in business is seldom confined to two parties,
the effect of allowing one, by this use of eminent domain power,
to take property away from the other, upon which the latter's
business is based, would be to encourage the continuation of the
practice by other rivals, to the great injury of the stability of
business investments. The language of Justice Upton, in the
7' State v. Pacific County Super. Ct., supra note 48, at 133, 1I7 Pac. at 756.
Italics are the author's.
- Ibid.
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condemnation case of Oregon Cascade R. R. v. Baily, covers
the situation of rival companies, as follows:
"If a railway company could condemn and appropriate
the ground and track of another similar corporation, so as
to deprive the first of its use, a thiid company could immedi-
ately proceed in the same manner against a second. The
proposition needs but to be stated to show its impropriety." 76
In that case the plaintiff railroad company was trying to appro-
priate lands from the defendant railroad company for the same
use and purpose, and contended that the defendant company was
withholding it to shut off competition. On this point Justice
Upton said:
"The defendant cannot hold lands it does not need
merely to prevent competition from a rival company. Nor
can the plaintiff take from the defendant what the defendant
does need in its business on any claim that the defendant
creates a monopoly." 77
In a similar case, in Minnesota, where one railway tried to
take the property of the other for the same use, under the general
power of eminent domain, the supreme court of that state, in de-
ciding against the power, said:
"If one railroad could, at its option, condemn the prop-
erty of another railroad company, we do not see why such
proceedings could not be continued as often as each different
company desired. The law of eminent domain does not sanc-
tion any such absurdity, especially where the public use sought
is identical with the one already enjoyed." 7.
There is another reason, probably mqre fundamental, for the
rule that "where there is no change in the use there can be no
change in ownership under the law of eminent domain". This
reason is to be found in the fact that the power of eminent do-
"' Supra note 53, at 175.
' Ibid. 178.
' Minneapolis and Western Ry. v. Minneapolis and St. L. Ry., 61 Minn. 502,
5o9, 63 N. W. 1035, IO38 (1895).
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main "has its foundation in the imperative law of necessity which
alone justifies and limits its existence",7 9 and it is difficult to find
a necessity for a change of ownership without a change in the
application of the property to a public use or purpose. In each
of the cases we have taken up, the condemnor alleged the neces-
sity of appropriation in order to carry on its public activities. In
each of them, except the Suburban R. R. Case, the court accepted
the evidence of the condemnor's necessity as proof, and based its
decision on that assumption. In the second power company
case, the court said of the corporation seeking to acquire the land
by condemnation, "It cannot develop its plant without acquiring
the relator's land", 0 and in the Marsh Mining Company Case,
Morgan, J., in the course of the majority opinion, said:
"We are convinced from a careful examination of the
evidence that for the convenient and economical development
and operation of its mine the use of the land is needed, and
that a reasonable necessity exists for the taking, If a reason-
able, although not an absolute, necessity exists to take prop-
erty for a public use, it is sufficient." 81
In the Suburban R. R. Case, Cartwright, J., who gave the opinion
of the court, doubted the real necessity of the railroad company's
using the route chosen, but said:
"Even in a case where there was no other way to build
a railroad, it was held that one corporation could not take
any part of the right of way of another company, except
for the purpose of a connection or intersection. Illinois Cent.
R. Co. v. Chicago, B. & N. R. Co., 122 Ill. 473, 13 N. E.
140. In that case there was an attempt to condemn for
railroad purposes a part of a right of way between the rocky
buffs and the eastern bank of the Mississippi river, where
there was a physical impossibility of building a road else-
where." 82
Jacobs v, Clearviey Water Supply Co., 2o Pa. 388, 193, 69 Ad, 870, 87I
(i908).
State v, Spokane County Super. Ct., spra note 48, at 22, 145 Pac. at
100Q.
4 Supra note 48, at 7, I65 1ac. at 1128.
" Supre note 46, at 2z24, N. E. at I092.
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In each of these cases it was pointed out that necessity to the
condemnor is not sufficient. As stated in the Marsh Mtiniq Com-
pany Case, "The aid of eminent domain is extended to the indus-
try, not to the individual"; 83 and, as brought out in the other
cases, it is the "public necessity", and not the necessity of the
condemnor, which is the paramount test. Looking at the class of
cases where the proposed use is the same as the existing use, the
decisions against the exercise of eminent domain power will be
justified on the ground that there can be no public necessity for a
change of ownership without a change of use. When the legis-
lature specifically designates the exact property which it authorizes
to be taken, this carries the implication that the taking is neces-
sary. However, the legislature itself is limited by the consti-
tutional requirement of due process, and in such cases the question
whether there be in fact a public necessity is subject to judicial
review. It will be recalled that in the Cary Library Case the legis-
lature authorized a corporation to take the library property from
the board of trustees, and administer it "in the same manner as if
held by the said trustees". In addition to the reasons which we
have discussed, the court in that case based its decision upon a
consideration of "public necessity". Said Knowlton, J., in con-
cluding the opinion of the whole court:
"The question arises whether taking property from one
party who holds it for a public use by another to hold it in
the same manner for precisely the same public use can be
authorized under the Constitution. Can such a taking be
founded on a public necessity? It is unlike taking property
for a public use which is already devoted to a different public
use. There may be a necessity for that. In the first case
the property is already appropriated to a public use as com-
pletely in every particular as it is to be. Can the taking be
found to be for the purpose which must exist to give it valid-
ity? In every case it is a judicial question whether the
taking is of such a nature that it is or may be founded on a
public necessity. If it is of that nature, it is for the Legisla-
ture to say whether in a particular case the necessity exists.
We are of opinion that the proceeding authorized by the
Statute was, in its nature, merely a transfer of property from
'Supra note 48, at io, i65 Pac. at Ii3o.
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one party to another, and not an appropriation of property
to public use nor a taking which was, or which could be
found by the Legislature, to be a matter of public necessity
(citing cases)." 84
Justice Mount stated the public necessity rule in a few words in
the Boom Company case, by quoting from a previous decision of
the court regarding property in public use. Said he:
" . . . 'it can not be taken to be used for the same purpose
in the same manner, as that would amount simply to a taking
of property from one and giving it to another, without any
benefit or advantage whatsoever to the public-an act which
the legislature is powerless to authorize.' " 88
Probably, in the light of the typical cases which we have
discussed, we could summarize the law of the decisions to be
that property devoted to a public use or purpose cannot be taken
by the power of eminent domain, to be devoted to substantially
the same use or purpose in other hands, for the reason that:
(i) to permit the compulsory process of eminent domain to be
thus employed would result in wresting property, by forced sale,
from its owner, against his will, merely to turn the property over
to another, thus depriving the owner of that protection which
organized governments are established to secure, and which fur-
nish one of the principal justifications for their existence; (2) it
would be an inconsistent and mutually contradictory exercise of
sovereign power; (3) it would be lending government power
and machinery to unfair competition and trade practices in the
field of business and industry; and (4) it could not be supported
by any justification of public necessity.
It is evident that the "same" use or purpose does not mean
in detail, but refers to the general aspects or larger outlines of the
use or purpose. For example, in the Marsh Mining Company
Case, the condemnor needed the land of the condemnee for tram-
way, storage, dumping, etc., purposes. There was no showing
that the condemnee was using the same land, or ever would use
Cary Library v. Bliss, supra hote 3r, at 379, 25 N. E. at 95.
State v. Pacific Coumity Sti er. Ct., supra note 48, at 133, 117 Pac. at 756.
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it, for these distinct purposes. Nevertheless, they were both en-
gaged in the same kind of "mining business", and the condemnor
wanted to take land necessarily used in the mining business, to
devote it to the same business, and it was held that this constituted
the "same" use or purpose. On the other hand, the mere fact
that the condemnor is engaged in the same business does not pre-
vent the condemnor from taking property from a condemnee who
is also engaged in the same business, else one railroad company
could never cross another railroad company's tracks with its
tracks; I6 nor does the fact that the condemnor wants the prop-
erty for the same identical use and purpose prevent his taking it
from the condemnee, when a judicial body can be convinced that
the condemnee is not making good in fulfilling what constitutes
the requisites of public use or purpose. 87  Public use has, in effect,
been distinguished from public purpose, and, contrary to the
earlier dictum of the United States Supreme Court,"' a state or
municipality may use the eminent domain power to take the prop-
erty of a public utility company and devote it to the same use,
when the purpose (at least in theory) is not to run it for private
profit but solely for the benefit of the public.89 The fact 'that the
purpose does not actually work out for the charging of lower
rates to the public would probably make no difference.90 The rule
of prohibition runs against property's being taken for the "same"
""It is manifest that if this could not be done then a general authority to
locate and construct new railroads would be nugatory." 2 LEwis, op. cit. mipra,
note 9, § 424.
'1 Starr Burying Ground Ass'n v. North Lane Cem. Ass'n, mspra note 39;
In re Brooklyn, 143 N. Y. 596, 38 N. E. 983 (1894), aff'd, 166 U. S. 685,- 7 Sup.
Ct. 718 (1897).
""There would be no change in the use, except the application of the profits,
and this would not bring the act within the power." McLean, J., in West River
Bridge Co. v. Dix, supra note 35, at 537.
'Tacoma v. Nisqually Power Co., 57 Wash. 420, lO7 Pac. igg (i9io);
Little Nestucca Road Co. v. Tillamook County, 31 Ore. r, 48 Pac. 465 (1897). See
State v. King County Super. Ct., supra note 8, where such condemnation was
upheld, although the part of the electric railway taken materially damaged the-
portion not taken. See Vermont Hydro-Electric Corp. v. Dunn, 95 Vt. 144, 112
Atl. 223 (i92I), to the effect that the United States, and the several states, by
their extraordinary powers incident to sovereignty, may take for themselves
property in public use, without special enactment; but municipal corporations
stand on the same footing as private corporations.
" The reason for this is that the purpose included a change of control,
which would be an end in itself in governmental experimentation.
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public use or purpose, or to be used in the "same" manner. An
examination of the decisions where the rule is recognized and ap-
plied,"1 a comparison of these with the decisions where the rule is
recognized but held inapplicable,12 and a consideration of some of
the dissenting opinions which mark a few of the cases,9 3 will show,
it is believed, that the meaning and application of the term "same"
depends, not only on the circumstances and facts of each case, but
upon an adequate and accurate presentation and analysis of those
facts, at the hearings and reviews before condemnation tribunals
and the courts. Once it be established, however, that the public
purpose or use is the "same", then the decisions are in accord in
holding that the property cannot be taken by the power of emient
domain.
Balancing Different and Conflicting Uses
There is not the same reason for an absolute prohibition of
taking property, which is in public use, when it is to be devoted
to a different public use, as there is when it is to continue in the
same use under different management. In the latter instance
the public could gain no benefit that it had not already been
enjoying, while in the former situation a new public benefit would
accrue. The reason for favoring a taking for a different public
use is especially supported when the encroachment on the old use
is slight, and the public benefit from the new use is manifest. Ac-
cordingly, in such cases the decisions seem to be uniform that a
general power of eminent domain is sufficient to authorize a taking
of this nature.94 The public need of such a taking, and the justice
91 State v. Pacific County Super. Ct.; Marsh Min. Co. v. Inland Empire
Min. Co.; Oregon Cascade R. R. v. Baily; State v. Mason County Super. Ct;
State v. Spokane County Super. Ct., all supra note 48; Suburban R. R. v. Metro-
politan West Side El. R. R., supra note 46; Cary Library v. Bliss, supra note 31.
I Starr Burying Ground Ass'ft v. North Lane Cem. Ass'n; St. Louis, etc.,
Co. v. Belleville City Ry.; Chicago West. Div. Ry. v, Metropolitan West Side
El. R. R.; Kansas & Texas Coal Ry. v. Northwestern Coal, etc., Co.; State v.
Skamania County Super. Ct.; Samish River Boom Co. v. Union Boom Co., all
supra note 48.
" See the dissenting opinion in Marsh Min. Co. v. Inland Empire Min., etc.,
Co., referred to on page i8, and Kansas & Texas Coal Ry, v. Northwestern
Coal, etc., Co., referred to on page 152,
" For cases so holding in the federal courts and in the courts of the different
states, see 2o C. J. 6o5 (92o) ; alto supra note 15.
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of the rule of eminent domain law permitting it, find particular
application in the crossing and recrossing of public ways, in the
form of railroads, highways and streets, and instrumentalities of
communication, such as the telephone and the telegraph, all of
which interlace our nation in all its parts and in every direction.95
Although two corporations may each be in the railroad business,
the condemnation by one of the other's property, merely for the
purpose of crossing, has never been considered to be a condenina-
tion of property in public use for the same use or purpose. "The
use is not the same as that of the prior road, but is rather a joint
or co6perative use, to be exercised and enjoyed by both railroad
companies, so as to furnish the public an additional line of travel
and transportation . " 9
The law which subjects railroads and other transportation
and travel ways to general eminent domain power for crossing
purposes is based upon the public policy to "preserve, multiply and
maintain highways for the benefit of the country and the general
public benefit".97  Naturally, this policy would be defeated if one
highway or railroad were allowed to cross another in such a way
as to hamper it in fulfilling its travel and transportation functions.
Therefore, the law does not require any and every property of the
condemnee to submit to the crossing company's general power
of eminent domain, even though it is needed; but only so much
as it can spare without too much interference with its legitimate
activity. Property whose loss would materially impair or destroy
ability to fulfill recognized public purpose obligations cannot be
taken by a grant of a general power of eminent domain, and, when
such a taking is attempted, a court of equity, upon timely appli-
cation, will intervene to prevent the threatened injury.9"
'CooLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIoNs (8th ed. 1927) i9o, n. 1; 2
LEwis, op. cit. supra note 9, § 424.
'Quoted from the syllabus of Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry. v. Chicago &
Western Ind. PR R., supra note 44.
' McGill, C., in National Docks, etc., Ry. v. United N. J. R. R. & C. Co.,
53 N. 3. L 217, 223, 21 AtI. 570, 572 (89).
' New York, etc., R. R. v. Bridgeport Traction Co., 65 Conn. 410, 32 At.
953 (i895); Humeston, etc., Ry. v. Chicago, etc., Ry., 74 Iowa 554, 38 N. W.
413 (1888); Chicago, etc., Ry. v. Chicago, etc., Ry., 91 Iowa 16, 58 N. W. 9 1S
(1894) ; Atchinson St. Ry. v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 31 Kan. 66o, 3 Pac. 284 (1884) ;
Union Terminal R. R. v. Board of R. R. Comm'rs, 54 KarL 352, 38 Pac.
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Accordingly, it has been held that one railroad company,
under its power of eminent domain to cross another railroad com-
pany's property, cannot build through the yards of another rai!-
road company and condemn and take property needed and used
by the latter company for yard, yard-tracks, and switches; 99 nor
take valuable property by laying its way through depot buildings
or grounds used for shops and other appurtenances necessary to
the transaction of railroad business. 100 Neither can it condemn
railroad property for a greater number of crossings than are
necessary,101 nor take the tracks used by another company, nor
even a joint use of such tracks, 02 nor its right of way, 10 3 even
though the right of way is badly needed. 04 The same kind of
property is immune from appropriation on the part of public
highways, roads, streets, and alleys.' 0 5 Telegraph and telephone
290 (1894) ; In re St. Paul, etc., Ry., 37 Minn. 164, 33 N. W. 701 (887) ; II re
Minneapolis, etc., Ry., 39 Minn. 162,39 N. W. 65 (1888) ; National Docks, etc., Ry.
v. United N. J. R. R. & C. Co., supra note 97; Jersey City, etc. Ry. v. Central
R. R. of N. J., 48 N. J. Eq. 379, 22 Atl. 728 (i8gi).
" Atlanta, etc., R. R. v. Atlanta, B. & A. R. R., 124 Ga. 125, 52 S. E. 320
(x95); Pennsylvania Railroad Company's Appeal, 8o Pa. 265 (1876) ; Appeal
of Pittsburg Junction R. R., 122 Pa. 5n, 6 At. 564 (1886) ; Appeal of Sharon
Ry., 122 Pa. 533, 17 Atl. 234 (1888) ; Sabine, etc., Ry. v. Gulf, etc., Ry., g4
Tex. 162, 46 S. W. 784 (i898); Rutland-Canadian R. R. v. Central Vt. Ry.,
72 Vt. 128, 47 Atl. 399 (igoo) ; State v. Super. Ct., 45 Wash. 27o, 88 Pac. 201
(19o7). Railroads have the same protection against impairment taking by
street railways as by other railroads. Del., L. & W. R. R. v. Stroudsburg,
Water Gap & Portland Street Ry., 289 Pa. 131, 137 Atl. 73 (927).
' Birmingham, etc., R. R. v. Louisville, etc., R. R., I52 Ala. 422, 44So. 679
(9o7); St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. v. Memphis D. & G. R. R., io2 Ark. 492,
143 S. W. 107 ,(I912) ; Louisiana, etc., Ry. v. Vicksburg Ry., 112 La. 915, 36
So. 8o3 (i9o4) ; Memphis, etc., R. R. v. Union Ry., 116 Tenn. 500, 95 S. W.
ioi9 (i9o6) ; State v. Super. Ct., 40 Wash. 389, 82 Pac. 417 (0905).
Perry County R. R. Extension Co. v. Newport, etc., R. R., i5o Pa. 193,
24 Atl. 709 (1892).
e See supra note I00; 2 LEwis, op. cit. supra note 9, § 419.
Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Chicago, etc., R. R., 122 Ill. 473, 13 N. E. 140
(887) ; In the Matter of City of Buffalo, 68 N. Y. 167 (1877).
'"Ibid.
'Atanta v. Central R. R. & Banking Co., 53 Ga. i2o (874) ; City Council
v. Georgia, etc., R. R., 98 Ga. i6i, 26 S. E. 499 (1896) ; City of Valparaiso v.
Chicago, etc., Ry., 123 Ind. 467, 24 N. E. 249 (i89o) ; Cincinnati, etc., Ry. v.
City of Anderson, I39 Ind. 49o, 38 N. E. 167 (1894) ; Chicago, etc., Ry. v. Stark-
weather, 97 Iowa i5g, 66 N. W. 87 (i896) ; Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Fari-
bault, 23 Minn. 167 (1876); St. Paul Union Depot Co. v. St. Paul, 30 Minn.
359, i5 N. W. 684 (1883); Peterson, etc., R. R. v. Paterson, 72 N. 3. L. i12, 6o
Atl. 47 (i9o5); Prospect Park & Coney Island R. R. v. Williamson, 9I N. Y.
552 (1883); Manhattan Ry. v. New York, 89 Hun 429, 35 N. Y. Supp.. 5o5
(1895) ; Rochester, etc., R. R, v. Rochester, 17 App. Div. 257, 45 N. Y. Supp.
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companies, in cofdemning easements over railroad property,,
through the exercise of their power of eminent domain, for the
construction and maintenance of the poles and lines, are subject
to the same rule. They cannot appropriate for their use property
which the railroad company must have in order to assure adequate
service to the public." 6
This rule works both ways, and other transportation 'ways
have the same protection against encroachment by the power of
eminent domain on the part of railroads. They also have the pro-
tection of the same rule against each other. Thus, it has been
held that a railway, under its general power of eminent donain,
cannot, in crossing, take public highway property so as to close
and vacate the street as a way of travel and transportation, and
that any such closing constitutes a public nuisance and is punish-
able as such.' 0 7  It was held, in the state of Washington, that a
railroad company could not acquire, by its power of eminent
domain, the exclusive right to use half of the street in the city
of Spokane, against the rights of the public; los and a New Jer-
sey court held that a railroad company could not obstruct the pub-
lic highway with its freight station, for the convenience of
its transportation business.' 09 The Supreme Court of Missouri
expressed the opinion that a public highway could not be laid so
as to take by eminent domain power a passageway for school chil-
687 (1897); Matter of E. 16ist Street, 52 Misc. 596, io2 N. Y. Supp. 5oo
(1907); Cleveland, etc., R. R. v. Akron, 6 Ohio N. P. (N. s.) 81 (1907): St.
Louis & S. F. R. R. v. City of Tulsa, 213 Fed. 87 (D. C. Okla., 1914) ; Winona,
etc., Ry. v. Watertown, 4 S. D. 323, 56 N. W. 1077 (1893) ; Richmond, etc., R.
R. v. Johnson, io3 Va. 456, 49 S. E. 496 (19o5) ; Chicago, etc., Ry. v. Williams,
148 Fed. 442 (C. C. Kan. i9o6) ; Town of Alvord v. G. N. Ry., 179 Iowa, 465,
161 N. W. 467 (1917); Oregon-Washington R. R. & Nay. Co. v. Castener, 66
Ore. 58o, 135 Pac. 174 (1913).
'New Orleans, etc., R. R. v. Southern, etc., Tel. Co., 53 Ala. 211 (0875)
Mobile, etc., R. R. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 12o Ala. 21, 24 So. 408 (1898);
Union Pacific R. R. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 30 Colo. 133, 69 Pac. 564 (1902);
Savannah, etc., Ry. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 112 Ga. 941, 38 S. E. 353 (901);
St. Louis, etc., R. R. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 173 Ill. 5o8, 5I N. E. 382 (898);
South Carolina, etc., R. R. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 65 S. C. 459, 43 S. E. 970
(i9o3); St. Louis, etc., R. R. v. Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co., 121 Fed. 276
(C. C. A. 8th, i9o3).
H° yde v. Minnesota D. & P. Ry., 29 S. D. 220, 136 N. W. 92 (1912).
108 State v. Spokane County Super. Ct., 62 Wash. 96, 113 Pac. 576 (1911).
"' State v. Morris and E. R. R., 25 N. J. L. 437 (1856).
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dren, adjoining a public high school building, and owned by the
board of education. 110 It has been decided in Pennsylvania that
a turnpike company, organized under a general law, cannot locate
on an existing highway,"' and that a plank road cannot take part
of a public highway already in existence and in use." 2 As stated
by Chancellor McGill, in the case of National Docks, etc., Ry. v.
United N. J. R. R. & C. Co., "It is not the policy of the law to
cripple or destroy one highway for the purpose of erecting
another." -11
In some states the right to cross is expressly given by stat-
ute, but this adds nothing to the general power of eminent domain,
and it has the same limitations." 4  In other states, statutes make
provision for a tribunal to determine what property can be taken
by the condemnor. 115 These bodies are governed by the same
rule against impairment, and their determinations are reviewable
in the courts. 16
The evils of too much liberality in applying the general rule
have sometimes caused legislatures to reassert the rule against
impairment, with special emphasis on the evil desired to be reached.
This is illustrated by a statute passed in Pennsylvania, which
makes it the duty of courts of equity "to ascertain and define by
their decree the mode of such crossing which will inflict the least
practical injury upon the rights of the company owning the road
to be crossed and to avoid grade crossings if it is reasonably
practicable to do so"."17  A decision of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania contains language which describes how a form of
condemnation once tolerated, such as a grade crossing, can be-
come increasingly objectionable with the economic development of
the country. The language of the court is as follows:
Cochran v. Wilson, 287 ,Mo. 210, 229 S. W. 1050 (1921).
tm Graff v. Bird-in-hand Turnpike Co., 128 Pa. 621, i8 AtI. 431 (1889), aff'd,
144 Pa. St. I5o, 22 AtI. 834 (I89I).
' Borough of Blakely v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 2 Lack. Legal
News 59 (Pa. i895).
m Supra note 97.
212 Lmwis, op. cit. supra note 9, at 769.
See supra note 24.
... Biglow, J., in Central Bridge Corporation v. Lowell, supra note 8, at 482.
n AcT OF JUNE i9, 187I, P. L. 136o, PA. STAT. (West ig2o) § 18473.
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"The time for grade crossings in this state has passed.
They ought not to be permitted, except in case of imperious
necessity. They admittedly involve great danger to life and
property. In the earlier period of railroads, this danger was
overlooked, or at least disregarded. The desire of the people
for this species of improvements tended to close their eyes to
the dangers involved. The traffic then upon railroads, was
comparatively light, and trains ran at long intervals. The
rapid development of the country, the enormous growth in
wealth, population, and business, has materially changed the
relations of railroads to the public and to each other. The
result is that we now see railroad companies and municipali-
ties spending enormous sums in correcting the defects of
earlier railroad construction, and especially in avoidinfg grade
crossings. We must therefore construe the act of 1871 in
accordance with our present surroundings." 'Is
The very nature and purpose of ways of travel and transpor-
tation make it necessary that they extend themselves in all direc-
tions. Therefore, when one of them wishes to take rights and
property from the other, sufficient to enable it to cross and con-
tinue its path of extension, the presumption of public necessity is
very strong. This presumption does not exist in favor of other
public utilities or property devoted to public use or purpose, which
permanently occupy more restricted areas. It cannot be supposed
in such cases that eminent domain authority is ever granted with
the intention of interfering with any prior public use, and the
circumstances would have to be very peculiar to justify it; 119
but, since both public uses purport to be for the public benefit,
where the interference is slight and the benefit great, condemna-
tion taking has been allowed. One public utility or public purpose
enterprise, however, cannot, under a general power of eminent
domain, take property from another when it would mean a
material impairment of the latter's ability to carry on its activity.120
It is difficult to lay down a hard and fast rule as to how far
' Perry County R. R. Extension Co. v. Newport, etc., R. R., supra note
i0, at i99, 24 Atl. at 710.
Rutland-Canadian R. R. v. Central Vt. Ry., supra note 99.
=o The cases supporting this rule are too numerous to list. See 2o C. J. 6o2
(i92o), n. 93, tabulating cases from the different jurisdictions in the United
States.
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the encroachment can go without interfering with the activity of
the condemnee so as to violate the rule against impairment. The
necessity of the condemnor, in relation to the necessity of the
public, is on one side; while the necessity of the condemnee, in
relation to the necessity of the public, is on the other side. In con-
sidering the situation of the condemnee, the Court of Appeals
of New York laid down a rule of guidance, which is often quoted,
as follows:
"In determining whether a power generally given, is
meant to have operation upon lands already devoted by the
legislature to a public purpose, it is proper to consider the
-nature of the prior public work, the public use to which it is
applied, the extent to which that use would be impaired or
diminished by the taking of such part of the land as may be
demanded for the subsequent public use." 121
With regard to considering them both together, the court said,
in the same opinion:
"If both uses may not stand together, with some toler-
able interference which may be compensated 'for with dam-
ages paid; if the latter use, when exercised, must supersede
the former; it is not to be implied from a general power
given, without having in view a then existing and particular
need therefor, that the legislature meant to subject lands de-
voted to a public use already in exercise to one which might
thereafter arise. A legislative intent that there should be
such an effect will not be inferred from a gift of power made
in general terms." 1
In applying the rule of necessity and. consistency and in
balancing the importance of the contesting uses in cases involving
the exercise of the general power of eminent domain, It has been
held that: a school house site cannot be taken from a county
poor farm,4 3 nor can land for a street; 124 the public square of a
22 In the Matter of City of Buffalo, supra note 103, at 175,
= Ibid.
'Appeal of Tyrone School Dilt,, 22 W. N. C. 513, i5 At. 667 (Pa. IW88);
rf, East Hampton v, County Comrn'rs, 154 Mass, 424, 28 N. E. g!8 (i8g9). •
' City of Edwardsville v. Madison County, 251 111. :6s, 96 N. E. 238
(19X').
172 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
village cannot be taken for a school house; 125 state school lands
cannot be taken for the uses of a water works public utility
company; 126 lands of the state, for the aid of destitute seamen,
cannot be taken for streets of a city; 127 land for a public library
cannot be taken for widening a street, even though the library will
not be taken nor destroyed; 121 land of gas company, for many
years in public use, cannot be taken for additional railway
tracks; 129 the right of way of a railroad cannot be taken' to relo-
cate a highway necessary for the construction of a public storage
reservoir; 130 a public street cannot be taken, nor any part thereof,
for a reservoir to supply the city with water; 131 land of a park
cannot be taken by an electric power-carrying line, 132 nor by a rail-
way, although the railway only wishes a quarter of an acre; 133
railroad land cannot be taken for a park; 134 part of a public
cemetery cannot be taken for street purposes; 135 land for a shore
road cannot be taken for a railroad; 136 a railroad right of way
cannot be taken for a public reservoir; 137 streets and alleys can-
not be taken for a college campus; 138 a highway cannot be over-
flowed by eminent domain power granted a public mill owner,
authorizing him to overflow lands; 139 an upper mill privilege can-
Davis v. Nichols, 39 Ill. App. 61o (i8go); McCullough v. Board of Edu-
cation, 51 Cal. 418 (1876).
'State v. Superior Court of Chelan County, 36 Wash. 381, 78 Pac. IOII
(904).
I re Rosebank Ave. in City of N. Y., 162 App. Div. 332, 147 N. Y. Supp.
638 (914).
City of Moline v. Green, 252 Ill. 475, 96 N. E. 911 (I91).
Scranton Gas & Water Co. v. Northern Coal & Iron Co., i92 Pa. 80, 43
AtI. 470 (1899).
"' Board of Hudson River Regulating District v. Fonda J. & G. H. Co., 127
Misc. Rep. 866, 217 N. Y. Supp. 781 (1926).
'Ex parie Manhattan Co., 22 Wend. 653.(N. Y. 1840).
Minnesota Power & Light Co. v. State, 225 N. W. 164 (Minn. 1929).
State v. Superior Court of Washington for Mason County, 136 Wash. 87,
238 Pac. 985 (925).
"Boston G. & R. Co. v. City Council of Cambridge, 166 Mass. 224, 44 N.
E. 140 (1896).
Evergreen Cemetery Ass'n v. City of New Haven, 43 Conn. 234 (875).
it re N. Y. & B. B. Ry., 2o Hun 201 (N. Y. i88o).
'Denver Power & Irrigation Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. R., 30 Col. 204, 69
Pac. 568 (I9O2).
South Western State Normal School's Case, supra note 13. 1
'Commonwealth v. Stephens, 27 Mass. 247 (1846).
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not be destroyed by the raising of a dam by a lower riparian mill
owner, under his power of eminent domain; 140 and lands and
water rights of a canal cannot be takeri for city water purposes. 141
It was held, in the United States District Court of Massachusetts,
that a municipal corporation may contest the taking of park
property by the United States government, on the ground that
the public use as a post office is not superior to its use as a park.
142
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting in South Caro-
litia, restrained the federal government from condemning and tak-
ing by eminent domain the right of way of a public service com-
pany, to use for government forestry purposes. 148  In each of
these cases the power of eminent domain was prevented from
taking property, although the property was desired and needed for
a recognized public use or purpose.
Property not in use and not necessary, which is owned by
a public service enterprise, may be taken under the general power
of eminent domain, to the same extent as the private property of a
private party; but here, as elsewhere, consideration must be given
to expanding service, and property not presently devoted to public
use, but held in reasonable anticipation of future use, is deemed
"devoted to a public use".' 44 Land "about to be" devoted to pub-
lic use cannot be taken for a different public use, 145 nor can land
held for a "prospective use".146 It has been held that land "laid
out" for waterways cannot be taken for a railway.141  The Ver-
mont Supreme Court held that a public service company is not
bound to show that it cannot conduct its business without retaining
the property sought, in order to defeat its being taken by eminent
domain; and the court restrained a city from taking certain water
Biglow v. Newell, 27 Mass. 348 (1846).
'Van Relpen v. City of Jersey City, 58 N. J. L. 262, 23 Atl. 740 (1896).
' In re Certain Land in Lawrence, iig Fed. 453 (D. Mass. 19o2).
" U. S. v. Southern Power Co., 31 Fed, (2d) 852 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
a" State v, Pacific County Super. Ct., 94 Wash, 69s 163 Pac. i5 (1917).
"5 East Hartford Fire Dist, V. Glastonbury Power Co., 92 Conn. 217, 102
Atl. 592 (1917),
" re Seneca Ave. in City of N. Y., 98 Misc. Rep, 712, 163 N. Y. Supp.
503 (1917).
14 State v. Super. Ct. fof Jetferson County, 91 Wash. 454, 157 Pac. 1097
(1i6).
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rights, not in use, from a hydroelectric power company.148  The
Supreme Court of Washington has held that land purchased for
a terminal will be protected from eminent domain appropriation,
although the railroad company is not yet in operation, if it is
being constructed in good faith.14 9  The Supreme Court of Ar-
kansas, under a similar situation, where the road was not quite
finished, restrained the taking of its station site for the right of
way by another railroad. The station site had been purchased
but not yet actually appropriated to the use, and the court called
it an inchoate appropriation,13 0 and held it to be as good as an
actual appropriation against the encroachment of eminent do-
main power. 15 '
Navigable streams, unlike railways, highways, roads, and
streets, are not so susceptible of being crossed with slight damage.
Accordingly it has been held that their navigability cannot be
interfered with, and that they cannot be crossed or occupied under
a general power of eminent domain; 152 neither can this be done
where the tide ebbs and flows.153 Special legislative authority
may be given to cross or to occupy these waters, where public
benefit demands it, 15 4 but such authority does not empower the
condemnor to destroy na{rigation or to impair it seriously. 55
It is evident that exceptional cases may, and do, arise, where
the great public benefit to ensue would appear to justify subjecting
public property, or the property of an established public purpose
enterprise to a taking on the part of those who are launching
a new and different public purpose activity, even though the taking
should violate the rule against impairment. The condemnors,
as well as the commissions and courts, are bound, however, by the
1"8 Vermont Hydro-Electric Corp. v. Dunn, supra note 89.
1.. State v. Super. Ct., supra note IOO.
' Italics are the author's.
2St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. v. Memphis D. & G. R. R., 102 Ark. 492, 143
s. W. I07 (I912).
'Commissioner of Highways v. Ludwick, 151 Mich. 498, 115 N. E. 419
(i9o8); Minnesota Canal & Power Co. v. Pratt, IOI Minn. 197, 112 N. W. 395
(i9o7) ; Charlestown v. County Comm. of Middlesex, 44 Mass. 202 (1841).
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rule against impairment, and it is not for them to say when the
exigency of such a public necessity has arisen; 156 but the legis-
lature is not thus bound. Unlike the situation presented by a
proposed taking for the same use, there is no constitutional inhibi-
tion on the legislature, preventing that body from authorizing an
impairment taking when the property taken is to be devoted to a
new, different, but paramount, use.1 57  This is particularly true
where the new use is construed as more necessary than the old
use, in the light of increased public benefit. 158 Since such stat-
utes enlarge the field of property subject to eminent domain taking,
and are in derogation of the rule against impairment, they
are strictly construed against the condemnor. Under a "more
necessary use" statute, it has been held that the fact that a
company's proposed canal will irrigate 2o,00o acres of land, as
against 2,500 acres which can be irrigated by the present com-
pany, does not make it either a different use or a more necessary
use, and that the latter's property can not be taken by the former
for the new use.159 It was held in Georgia that statutory author-
ity to connect a mill tramway with a railroad line did not subject
a second tract to easement condemnation for a crossing by a tram-
way, in order to enable the mill owner to get to his timber.
160 The
Supreme Court of Minnesota held that legislative authority to sub-
ject "water courses, bays, lakes, dams" to condemnation did not
authorize the lowering of a lake to the injury of navigation.
161
Authority given by the legislature to take waters of any stream,
lake, or pond, "in whole or in part", was held not to subject to a
condemnation taking any water already appropriated to public
use. 162 Legislative authority to take by condemnation "needed real
Central Power and Light Co. v. Willacy County, i4 S.W. (2d) io2
(Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
I Ibid.
"'Mari County Water Co. v. Marin County, 145 Cal. 586, 79 Pac. 28z
(I9o4).
' Portneuf Irrigation Co. v. Budge, 16 Idaho ii6, :oo Pac. xo46 (i9o9).
Valdosta M. & W. Ry. v. Adel Lumber Co., 136 Ga. 559, 71 S. E. 803
(191x).
I Minnesota Canal & Power Co. v. Koochiching Co., 97 Minn. 42, io7 N.
W. 4o5 (igo6).
Water Co. v. Wallingford, p2 Conn. 293, 44 Atl. 235 (i899).
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estate", for college purposes, was held not to include alleys, and
streets.163  An act providing for condemnation by a municipal
corporation of land, water, water rights, or property, "when the
governing authorities deem it proper", was held not to be broad
enough to require the submission to condemnation of lands and
water rights owned by a canal company.' 64  Authority granted by
the legislature to construct its lines "over any public roads, streets,
or highways" was held not to mean over railroads or roadways
of railroads. 16 5 Legislative authority given to a public canal com-
pany to alter, by eminent domain, any part of a public road or
highway which might "interfere" with its construction was held
not to permit of such an alteration-taking from a turnpike com-
pany which only in "some degree" thus interfered. 166 It was held
in Virginia that legislative authority to construct "along and paral-
lel" to a railroad did not permit a telegraph company, by easement
condemnation, to construct along and "upon" the right ot way of
a railroad.167 Where a statute seems to authorize an impairment
taking when necessity demands it, there is an obligation on the part
of the condemnor to use every means to avoid such a necessity.
This obligation is sometimes expressed in the language of the
statute, 6 " but, whether so expressed or not, it is implied as a part
of that which goes to make up the requisite of actual necessity.16 9
An illustration of the strictness with which these "necessity" stat-
utes are construed is afforded by the language of theSupremeCourt
of Pennsylvania in the case of Baltimore, etc., R. R. v. Butler Pass.
Ry. 170 .A statute in Pennsylvania permits a taking by eminent
domain of a right of easement over railroad property for grade
crossings, where it is not reasonably practicable to avoid it. The
163 South Western State Normal School's Case, supra note 13, at 246, 62 Atl.
at 99.
.. Van Reipen v. City of Jersey City, su.'ra note 141.
' New York City & N. R. R. v. Central Union Tel. Co., 21 Hun 261 (N. Y.
i88o).
" Bradshaw v. Rodgers, 2o Johns. lO2 (N. Y. 1822).
'1 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. N. & W. R. R., 88 Va. 920, 14 S. E. 803 (1892).
See infra note 170.
See infra note 174.
L0 2o7 Pa. 4o6, 56 AtI. 959 (1904).
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syllabus summarizing the opinion of the court in that case reads
as follows:
."In determining whether it is practicable to avoid a
grade crossing, the court will not consider the expense of an
overhead structure, not its unsightliness, nor the fact that
damages may have to be paid to the owners of private prop-
erty by reason of the erection of such structure; .nor that
an overhead structure will interfere with travel on a street,
will frighten horses, and will obstruct the view of coming
trains; nor that local sentiment is in favor of such grade
crossings." 171
Under the statute in question, the location of the condemnor's
grade crossings so as to cross the condemnee's tracks twice, when
it was practicable not to cross them at all, was restrained.'7 2 Under
the same statute, where it was shown that a dangerous grade cross-
ing could be avoided by the expenditure of $7,000 on the part of.
the condemnor, a grade cfossing was restrained.' 7 3 In a case
where it was contended that the statute, by necessary implication,
authorized an impairment-takirig of railroad property, the taking
was restrained upon a showing by the condemnor's engineer, that
the necessity of cutting up the condemnee's failroad yards could
be avoided by ari expenditure of $18,ooo by the condemnor rail-
road company.1
7 4
Whether two different and conflicting uses are consistent and
can stand together, or inconsistent and cannot stand together,
presents a problem of mixed fact, public policy, and law, all
looking to the, greatest public good with the least sacrifice prac-
ticable on the part of those whose properties are already serving
the public. It can be concluded from the typical cases herein
referred to and the rulings of the courts in deciding them, and
from other similar cases, that the presumption is against a taking
for the new use; that even when. allowed it cannot be done at the
2o7 Pa. 406.
IT. Perry Cotnty R. R. Extfnsion Co. v. Newport, etc., R. R., supra note
O Pennsylvania R. R. v. Braddock Ry., I52 Pa. iI6, 25 Ati. 78o (01893).
'1 Estate v. Superior Court of Whitman County, 45 Wash. 270, 88 Pac. 2om
(1907).
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cost of destroying, or even materially impairing, the old use, under
a general power of eminent domain; that special statutes with
special powers will be strictly construed against the condemnor;
and that they will not be construed to carry by implication an
enlargement of the field of property subject to impairment-taking,
beyond that which is unavoidably necessary to carry such statutes
into effect.
In introducing the subject of which this is the second article,
it was said that eminent domain power has not always been able
to reach desired property, even for a recognized public use or
purpose, and that this must be due to something about the prop-
erty which gives it the capacity to resist the power, or something
about the power or its exercise which incapacitates it from reach-
ing the property. This article brings to a close the consideration
of decisions dealing with the resistent capacity of property to repel
eminent domain power because of the physical nature of the
property moved against, or the nature of the owner's legal interest
in the property, or the relation of those intangible interests to the
tangible property and to each other, and finally because of certain
trusts or public uses which have impressed themselves upon the
property moved against.
(Author's Note: A shorter treatment, but one which deals
with no less an important phase of the subject, will appear in a
subsequent article. It will take up Part II of this series of articles,
or "The Power", and will discuss factors of time, distance, and
place, and certain other factors which condition the force of the
power of eminent domain, and prevent it from reaching the prop-
erty it moves against for a public use or purpose.)
